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Abstract
Some thinkers have claimed that expert performance with technology is characterized by a kind of disappearance of that 
technology from conscious experience, that is, by the transparency of the tools and equipment through which we sense and 
manipulate the world. This is a claim that may be traced to phenomenological philosophers such as Heidegger and Merleau-
Ponty, but it has been influential in user interface design where the transparency of technology has often been adopted as a 
mark of good design. Moreover, in the philosophy of cognitive science, such transparency has been advanced as necessary 
for extended cognition (the situation in which the technology with which we couple genuinely counts as a constitutive part of 
our cognitive machinery, along with our brains). By reflecting on concrete examples of our contemporary engagement with 
technology, I shall argue that the epistemic challenges posed by smart artefacts (those that come equipped with artificial-
intelligence-based applications) should prompt a reassessment of the drive for transparency in the design of some cases of 
technology-involving cognition. This has consequences for the place of extended minds in the contemporary technological 
context.
Keywords Artificial intelligence · Extended cognition · User interface design · Skilled tool use · Phenomenological 
transparency
1  Extended senses and extended minds
Designed by Cyborg Nest, a group of digital pioneers and 
transhumanists, North Sense is a recent addition to the per-
sonal technology market (https ://cybor gnest .net/produ cts/
the-north -sense , last accessed 24 March 2017; for an intro-
duction and discussion, see Emslie 2017). At first sight, it 
might seem that this product is not something to get overly 
excited about. Its only mechanical function is to vibrate gen-
tly when it faces magnetic north, and there is nothing par-
ticularly new about technology detecting the Earth’s electro-
magnetic field for us. That’s what compasses do. However, 
any such indifference would be misplaced, because North 
Sense is pushing at the door of our species’ much-heralded 
cyborg future. Tiny, and encased in body-compatible sili-
cone, it is designed to be fixed onto the upper part of the 
wearer’s chest using piercings. This distinctive and unusual 
corporeal anchoring means that the magnetic-north-tracking 
vibrations produced by the device are felt in an intimate way 
by the wearer. In addition, North Sense is designed to be left 
permanently turned on, meaning that its effects are standing 
features of the wearer’s ongoing experience.
First-person reports from early adopters of North Sense 
provide evidence that the technology quickly becomes 
deeply integrated into the wearer’s cognitive life. Most 
strikingly, orientation and position start to play a bigger-
than-usual role in the structuring of memory. Scott Cohen, 
one of the co-founders of Cyborg Nest, and also one of the 
first to have North Sense fitted, describes this phenomenon 
as follows: ‘It is hard to put into words only a few hours 
after attaching the North Sense, but the feeling I am left 
with is profound. The impact of immediately sensing my 
position created a permanent memory. I vaguely recall the 
colours and sounds in the room, but I remember my posi-
tion vividly.’ (https ://www.cybor gnest .net/, last accessed 21 
March 2017) What North Sense offers, then, is a powerful 
combination of corporeal and experiential close coupling, 
permanent presence, and altered cognitive processing—a 
transformative cocktail of entanglement and enhancement. 
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Indeed, the Cyborg Nest team claims that, with North Sense 
installed, one does not merely deploy technology that allows 
one to detect the Earth’s magnetic field; one senses that field. 
By these lights, North Sense is an artificial sense organ that 
expands our human perceptual capacities. And that, it might 
surely be argued, really is new.
As I interpret these claims, given that North Sense reli-
ably detects magnetic north—something that human beings 
cannot ordinarily do with their purely organic sensory 
machinery—it seems largely straightforward that if North 
Sense is genuinely part of its wearer’s sensory machinery, 
on a par with her eyes and ears, then it has succeeded in 
endowing that person with a new sense. The hard part, I 
think, is securing the antecedent in this conditional, that is, 
the claim that North Sense genuinely counts, in an entirely 
non-metaphorical way, as a constituent part of its wearer’s 
sensory machinery. So what precisely is it about a corpo-
really installed North Sense device that might conceivably 
justify this conclusion?
Let us widen our view. For although the specific fea-
tures of North Sense are intriguing, the question just posed 
exposes an issue that reaches well beyond that particular 
piece of technology and, indeed, well beyond perception 
as a psychological capacity. Here, then, is the more general 
question of interest: when, if ever, does an item of technol-
ogy-in-use genuinely count as part of one’s psychological 
machinery (sensory or otherwise), as opposed to part of 
the external world? This is a question that has been exer-
cising a number of philosophers of cognitive science in 
recent years, in the debate over the so-called extended mind 
hypothesis (henceforth ExM; see Clark and Chalmers 1998; 
Clark 2008 for canonical treatments, and for a more recent 
collection that contains criticisms, defences, and develop-
ments of the view, see; Menary 2010). Advocates of ExM 
(or of the hypothesis of extended cognition—I shall use the 
terms ‘mind’ and ‘cognition’ interchangeably) hold that the 
physical machinery of mind sometimes extends beyond the 
skull and skin. More precisely, according to ExM, there are 
actual (in this world) cases of intelligent thought and action, 
in which the material vehicles that realize the thinking and 
thoughts concerned are spatially distributed over brain, 
body, and world, in such a way that certain external elements 
are rightly accorded fundamentally the same cognitive status 
as would ordinarily be accorded to a subset of your neurons.
Two clarificatory remarks regarding ExM: First, when 
one wonders what sorts of external elements might figure 
in instantiations of an extended mind, it is immediately 
tempting to point to the array of information-sensitive, 
information-gathering, information-storing, and informa-
tion-manipulating devices readily found in our high-tech 
modern world, devices such as smartphones, tablets, and 
instances of wearable computing. However, it is worth not-
ing that, as far as the letter of ExM goes, less sophisticated 
items of ‘information technology’ such as notebooks (the 
old-fashioned kind), tally sticks, and abacuses would, under 
the right circumstances, do just as well. To borrow Andy 
Clark’s rich and suggestive phrase, we human beings are 
natural born cyborgs (Clark 2003) who have been coupling 
with technology pretty much for as long as we’ve been on 
the planet as a species. Nevertheless, there seems little doubt 
that much of the contemporary interest in ExM stems from 
the way in which it chimes with, and helps us to come to 
terms with, our modern experience of technology.
The second clarification is that, in the characterization 
of ExM given above (which, as a formulation of the view, 
is not in any way idiosyncratic), the term ‘extended’ has 
the sense of spatial (environment-encompassing) exten-
sion, not of performance enhancement. Of course, in some 
cases of (spatially) extended cognition, psychological per-
formance will, indeed, be enhanced, and thus, cognition will 
be extended in that other sense too. For example, if North 
Sense is genuinely part of its wearer’s sensory machinery, 
then it extends her psychological machinery in both senses 
of the term. Thus, although it is physically connected to 
the skin in an intimate way, it remains an external element 
(i.e., it is not a biological part of the human organism), so 
it provides a case of ExM; and it allows the wearer to track 
magnetic north—something that she could not do prior to 
having it fitted—so it enhances psychological performance. 
Of course, even if North Sense is not genuinely part of its 
wearer’s sensory machinery, it still might enable her to 
respond cognitively to new environmental stimuli, in which 
case it extends her mind in the enhancement sense of the 
term, but not the spatial sense.
The foregoing discussion should remind us once again 
that it is the ‘if’ in phrases such as ‘if North Sense is genu-
inely part of its wearer’s sensory machinery’ that remains to 
be substantiated. In other words, we still need an account of 
when some external element, such as an item of technology, 
qualifies as a constituent part of one’s psychological machin-
ery, that is, in the relevant sense, as part of one’s extended 
mind. As one might expect, there are several proposals out 
there for delivering this result, and here is certainly not the 
place to rehearse them all or to explore the sometimes bad-
tempered debate that has surrounded them (Menary 2010, 
is a good place to start; for my own favoured way of argu-
ing for ExM, see e.g.; Wheeler 2010, 2011a, 2013). There-
fore, I shall explore just one thought in the vicinity, which 
is that cognitive extension depends on the phenomenologi-
cal property of transparency. The concept of transparency 
at work here has its roots in certain prominent philosophi-
cal—more precisely, phenomenological—analyses of tool 
use. The next section of this paper will explain the notion 
more detail. Just to get us going, however, the rough and 
ready idea is this: where external technology is used in a 
skilled and hitch-free manner, that technology disappears 
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from the conscious apprehension of the user. It is invisible 
to her. The proposal that will concern us here, then, is that 
this sort of disappearance or invisibility on the part of the 
technology—henceforth, its transparency—is necessary for 
that technology to meet the target constituency condition 
and thus for it to furnish us with a case of ExM. In saying 
that this proposal will concern us here, I should stress that 
my aim is not to defend it, but rather to lay it out and then 
to discuss certain issues that come to light once one takes 
it as a point of departure. Ultimately, I will be interested in 
what the consequences are when transparent technology—
technology which might, partly in virtue of its transparency, 
count as, or at least be on the way to counting as, part of our 
psychological machinery—is itself smart, that is, equipped 
with artificial intelligence (AI).
2  The disappearing tool
To bring the pivotal notion of transparency into proper view, 
let us begin by taking a peak at some of its philosophical 
past. At one point in his magnum opus, Being and Time, 
Heidegger (1927) presents an analysis of our everyday 
experiences with entities. Famously, he argues that we ordi-
narily encounter entities as (what he calls) equipment, that 
is, as being for certain sorts of tasks (cooking, hair-care, 
text-editing, navigation, and so on). Designed tools clearly 
provide the paradigm case of equipment, although not the 
only instance. According to Heidegger, when we skillfully 
manipulate equipment in a hitch-free manner, we have no 
conscious apprehension of the items of equipment in use as 
independent objects, that is, as something like identifiable 
bearers of determinate states and properties. Thus, to use 
Heidegger’s most-quoted example, while engaged in trou-
ble-free hammering, the skilled carpenter has no conscious 
recognition of the hammer, the nails, or the work-bench, in 
the way that one would if one stood back and thought about 
them. In other words, tools-in-use become phenomenologi-
cally transparent. All we experience (often in an indetermi-
nate and non-thematic way) is the ongoing task (e.g., the 
hammering). Therefore, to be more specific, it is not only 
the tool itself but one’s interface with it that disappears. Of 
course, transparency is not the only possible way of relat-
ing to equipmental entities. When skilled practical activity 
is disturbed, say by a broken or malfunctioning tool that 
is in need of repair, that item of equipment is certainly no 
longer phenomenologically transparent to the user. It is itself 
apprehended in that user’s conscious experience, either as 
presenting a barrier to skilled activity or, in extreme cases, 
as a context-free object with, for example, a certain weight 
or size. Nevertheless, the idea is that, under the right circum-
stances, equipment becomes transparent.
It is worth pausing here to make a clarificatory remark 
about a rather different notion of transparency that is in the 
same technology-oriented ballpark as our target concept. My 
aim here is merely to register the fact that this alternative 
notion of transparency exists and is genuinely different, and 
then to put it to one side, so that it does not confuse matters. 
Sometimes, technology is described as being transparent 
when a specified class of users is able to understand pre-
cisely how it functions. This is a perfectly reasonable notion 
of transparency, but note that a device which is transparent 
in this sense may be broken or malfunctioning, and so will 
not be transparent in the phenomenological sense, and that a 
device which is phenomenologically transparent in use may 
be impenetrable in its inner workings, and so will not be 
transparent in the ‘open to understanding’ sense. Therefore, 
there is a double dissociation between the two concepts. I 
will be concerned only with the phenomenological notion.
To return to the main plot, in our ordinary way of thinking 
about things, tool use is a matter of action, of changing or 
manipulating the world: think of using a hammer, to bang 
in nails, to build something, that is, to bring something new 
into existence. However, as a famous example from Merleau-
Ponty (1945) indicates, there is also a perceptual dimension 
to some cases of tool use. Merleau-Ponty observes that a 
blind person using her cane in a skilled and hitch-free man-
ner does not consciously apprehend the cane itself. On a 
first impression, it might seem that this is simply another 
case of transparency in action: the blind person uses the 
cane for finding her way around, and when she does so in 
an expert, smooth, and undisturbed fashion, the cane disap-
pears from conscious apprehension. However, now notice 
that the cane is also a device that enables the blind person 
to access the world—to locate things in space. From this 
perspective, when one says that the blind person no longer 
consciously apprehends the cane in use, one might well con-
clude that, in that respect, the cane is just like the biological 
machinery that constitutes one of her (properly functioning) 
organic sense organs. When hearing is going well, she does 
not experience her ears as information-gathering objects. In 
fact, in ordinary usage, she does not experience her ears as 
such at all. They are transparent to her. What happens is that 
she experiences the world through her ears. The situation is 
similar with regard to her cane. She doesn’t experience the 
cane as such. It is transparent to her. She experiences the 
world through her cane. Put another way, the blind person’s 
experiential interface is with the world beyond the cane, not 
with the cane itself.
In some cases, then, one accesses the world through 
technology, and in doing so, one accesses the world in a 
new way. Moving beyond the analyses offered by phenom-
enological philosophy, one might add detail to this picture 
by focussing on the experiences of so-called sensory sub-
stitution subjects. The phenomenon of sensory substitution 
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occurs when technological augmentation enables one sen-
sory modality to support the kind of environmental access 
and interaction ordinarily supported by a different sensory 
modality. The seminal work in this area began with Bach-
y-Rita’s (1972; Bach-y-Rita and Kercel 2002) research on 
tactile-vision sensory substitution (henceforth TVSS). In 
one version of this work, congenitally blind subjects are 
equipped with a head- or shoulder-mounted camera that con-
veys information, from video images, via the activation of an 
array of vibrators located on the subject’s back, abdomen, or 
thigh. After a short period of adaptation, those TVSS sub-
jects who actively control the information received, either 
by manipulating their bodies or by manipulating the camera, 
are able to make reliable judgments about things such as the 
number, relative size, and position of distal objects in three-
dimensional space, and to perform actions such as reaching 
out and picking up objects. Moreover, sensory substitution 
subjects routinely report a shift in perceptual experience, 
with some organically blind users of sensory substitution 
systems reporting experiences that might be categorized as 
visual qualia, such as experiences of phosphenes (the see-
ing of light without light actually entering the eye) (Ortiz 
et al. 2011). Therefore, blind subjects now access and expe-
rience the world in ways that are characteristic of the dis-
tal sense of vision, a sense that, organically speaking, they 
do not have. The most straightforward (but also the most 
controversial) claim in the vicinity here would be that post-
adaptation TVSS subjects genuinely see (enjoy authentic 
visual phenomenal consciousness), in spite of the fact that 
the relevant channel of proximal stimulation is tactile (vibra-
tions on the skin caused by the TVSS technology). It may be, 
however, that what one ought to say is that TVSS engenders 
a transformation in perceptual consciousness, such that, even 
though the proximal stimuli remain tactile in character, the 
post-adaptation conscious experience is not correctly catego-
rized as one of touch, even if it is not vision.
For present purposes, the most important feature of TVSS 
is that post-adaptation subjects do not normally have the 
conscious tactile experience of the vibrations taking place 
on the surface of their skin. Rather, they simply experience 
the distal world that the technological augmentation makes 
available to them. And although it is possible for some sub-
jects to switch sensory mode so as to experience the vibra-
tions, that requires a deliberate cognitive effort on their part, 
at which point the experiences of the distal world that the 
technology supports are lost to them. Therefore, even though 
the transformative effect of sensory substitution technology 
is arguably greater than that of the blind person’s cane, the 
fundamental phenomenological signature exhibited remains 
in force: in hitch-free usage—including usage that is not dis-
rupted by purposeful willings by the subjects concerned—
TVSS devices are transparent. Their users do not experience 
the technology itself; they experience the world through the 
technology.
TVSS is a case of sensory substitution, since environ-
mental access and conscious experiences usually achieved 
via the eyes are achieved via a different route. This remains 
a plausible way of describing things, even if one takes the 
outcome to be vision-like, rather than strictly vision. Now, 
we have just seen that TVSS technology-in-use is routinely 
transparent. However, what about cases of sensory enhance-
ment (of cognitive extension in the secondary sense identi-
fied earlier), cases in which a device allows its user to be 
sensitive to environmental stimuli that are not accessible 
by the technologically unaugmented organic human senses? 
One might reasonably wonder whether the transition from 
substitution to enhancement is a phenomenological game 
changer here. More specifically, is the hitch-free use of sen-
sory enhancement technology ever transparent? To bring the 
answer to this question into view, we need to register the fact 
that we have been making the distinction between sensory 
substitution and sensory enhancement from a species-level 
perspective, with the dividing line set by the evolved organic 
sensory repertoire that human beings standardly possess. 
From that vantage point, TVSS and, say, North Sense fall on 
opposite sides of the substitution-enhancement line. How-
ever, from the perspective of the individual congenitally 
blind subject, TVSS is already a case of sensory enhance-
ment. The congenitally blind person’s sensory repertoire 
does not include vision, so the TVSS technology is a sensory 
enhancement rather than a sensory replacement. In other 
words, once we adopt the first-person perspective, TVSS 
and North Sense are equivalent and there is no reason to 
think that their experiential profile need be any different. In 
fact, North Sense itself is a somewhat complicated exam-
ple, because its principal epistemic effect is in terms of an 
enhanced appreciation of spatio-bodily position and orienta-
tion, rather than in terms of, say, how many objects there are 
on the other side of the room. Nevertheless, and intriguingly, 
verbal reports from early adopters of the North Sense pack-
age suggest that the transparency condition is sometimes 
met. For example, Scott Cohen, mentioned earlier, talks of 
‘immediately sensing [his] position’ when using the device 
(https ://www.cybor gnest .net/north -sense , last accessed 
15 March 17, my emphasis), and Liviu Babitz (also from 
Cyborg Nest) reports that, after several weeks of wearing 
the device, he sometimes fails to feel the vibrations, even 
though the device is functioning successfully (interview for 
the BBC’s Tomorrow’s World, http://www.bbc.co.uk/guide 
s/zs4bt v4?intc_type=singl ethem e&intc_locat ion=tomor 
rowsw orld&intc_campa ign=tomor rowsw orld&intc_linkn 
ame=guide _brain hacki ng_conte ntcar d15, last accessed 15 
August 2017). It seems, then, that enhancement does not 
undermine the possibility of transparency.
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The final stop on our tour of transparency takes us beyond 
both the idea of tools designed for specific actions and the 
idea of tools as dedicated sensory channels. It is already 
the case that we routinely offload data storage (one kind of 
‘memory’) onto our personal technology. To give just one 
everyday example, in the age of mobile phones with con-
tacts lists, most people commit far fewer phone numbers (if 
any) to their organic memory stores. However, the bulk of 
the contextual reasoning by which we decide, for example, 
precisely why and when we need to make a call, and whom 
we need to call, remains a neural achievement. But now, 
imagine a not-too-distant future in which advances in AI 
enable us to offload the contextual reasoning too onto tech-
nology. This is only just science fiction. For example, James 
Kozloski at IBM has patented the technology for what he 
calls a cognitive assistant, a device that uses a combination 
of surveillance (monitoring its owner’s activity, perhaps, 
as a wearable), machine learning (to become knowledge-
able about patterns, regularities, events, and situations in its 
owner’s life), and predictive processing (to determine what 
information its owner needs in her present situation). The 
device aims either to provide its owner with the information 
she needs or to give her appropriate prompts, so that she can 
retrieve that information from her own brain (see LaFrance 
2016). What on-the-horizon technology such as the cogni-
tive assistant demonstrates is that the notion of technological 
enhancement is not limited to new sensory discriminations 
or to the effects that such discriminations may have on the 
character of memory, but stretches into the very heart of 
cognition central—to capacities such as categorization (what 
sort of situation am I in?) and decision-making (what should 
I do?). In addition, given that, as I have argued, the possibil-
ity of transparency is not disrupted by the fact of enhance-
ment, there seems to be no particular reason, on grounds 
of the psychologically central nature of the enhancement 
concerned, to think that such smart tools will not become 
transparent in use. One might think that there is a snag with 
this generalization, namely that the interface between the 
user and, say, the cognitive assistant must be visible to the 
user. However, this conclusion depends on how one imagi-
nes that interface. If one thinks of Kozloski’s device on the 
model of an app such as Siri or Cortana, or a device such 
as Alexa—that is, on the model of technology with which 
the user converses in language—then, the visibility of the 
interface seems much more likely than if we think in terms 
of information projected into one’s visual field by an optical 
head-mounted display, in the way that Google Glass once 
promised. Surely, one could incorporate the information 
transmitted in this way into one’s action and reasoning in 
such a way that one would simply fail to notice its external 
technological source or its mode of presentation.
Therefore, when skilled tool use is trouble-free, the tools 
in question may disappear from conscious apprehension. 
This plausibly applies as much to smart technology that has 
been smoothly integrated into one’s perception-action cycles 
as it does to an expertly wielded hammer. Unsurprisingly, 
perhaps, this phenomenological account of how things are 
for tool users has been adopted in a normative key by some 
technology designers, and, perhaps, most obviously by some 
computer interface designers. As Wendt (2013) observes, 
interface designers have often been attracted by the thought 
that, when it comes to interfaces, ‘invisible’ goes hand in 
hand with ‘seamless, efficient and functionally optimized’, 
while ‘visible’ goes hand in hand with ‘cumbersome, inef-
ficient and functionally suboptimal’. Thus transparency is 
often advanced as a sign of high levels of efficiency and 
functionality, and, therefore, as something for which design-
ers should aim. As the philosopher Alva Noë remarks: ‘You 
never ask, when confronted with a doorknob, What is this? 
For the question even to come up is for the doorknob’s util-
ity already to have been undermined. If you even notice the 
knob, it’s potentially bad design’ (Noë 2015, p. 101). In what 
follows, I’ll argue that, in the case of smart technology that 
occupies cognition central, we should be suspicious of the 
urge to design for transparency. To bring this worry into 
proper view, however, we need first to explore the connec-
tion between the transparent tool and the extended mind.
3  Tools are us
As we have seen, in cases of extended cognition, the machin-
ery of mind stretches beyond the skull and skin, in the sense 
that certain external elements are, like an individual’s neu-
rons, genuine constituents of the material realizers of that 
individual’s cognitive states and processes. Put in a some-
what attention-grabbing way, if using your mobile phone 
counts as an instance of extended cognition (for example, 
if it is part of your memory, such that, in a sense that would 
need to be carefully unpacked, you know the phone numbers 
stored in it), then losing that phone would be equivalent to 
losing some of your neurons. By contrast, in cases of what 
is now often called embedded cognition, the machinery of 
mind remains internal, but the performance of that inner 
mental machinery is causally scaffolded in significant ways 
by certain external factors. On this view, the external ele-
ments of interest are not genuine constituents of the material 
realizers of our cognitive states and processes, even though 
thought and action depend on the causal contributions they 
make. If using your mobile phone counts as an instance of 
embedded cognition (for example, if it enables you to fluidly 
and reliably access phone numbers that are not stored in your 
memory), then losing that phone might well be disruptive—
distressing even—but at least your mental machinery would 
still be intact. The difference between extended cognition 
and embedded cognition is the difference between a North 
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Sense device genuinely being part of its wearer’s sensory 
machinery, on a par with her eyes and ears, and a North 
Sense device being ‘no more than’ a necessary causal fac-
tor in producing different inner experiences and differently 
shaped inner memories.
What is the relationship between the transparency of tools 
and the truth or otherwise of the extended mind hypothesis 
(ExM)? Here are two possibilities: (1) given a situation in 
which an organic human being is using a tool, the transpar-
ency of that tool when in use is sufficient for it to be a genu-
ine part of that individual’s mental machinery—if the tool 
is transparent, then what we confront is a case of extended 
cognition; (2) given a situation in which an organic human 
being is using a tool, the transparency of that tool when 
in use is necessary for it to be a genuine part of that indi-
vidual’s mental machinery—if the tool is not transparent, 
then what we confront is not a case of extended cognition. I 
do not know of anyone who openly defends (1) in the bald 
form that I have stated it here. Kiverstein and Farina (2012) 
arguably treat transparency as sufficient for agent and tool 
to count as a single system, but additional considerations 
figure in their justification for treating that system as a whole 
as a cognitive system. In addition, Wheeler (2005) presents 
a neo-Heideggerian analysis in which transparency defea-
sibly indicates that some of the distinctive features of the 
skilled intelligent behaviour in question must be traced to 
the causal contributions of beyond-the-skin factors, but, as 
the distinction between embedded and extended cognition 
indicates, that is not equivalent to ExM. However, the lack 
of straightforward advocates for claim (1) need not detain 
us here, since claim (2) will be enough for our purposes. 
So what about the claim that transparency is necessary for 
extended cognition? Where might we find that view making 
itself heard?
Consider the following passage from Carter et al. (2018, 
4): ‘[I]n normal operation, mind-extending tools should 
seek to by-pass the epistemic gatekeepers of deliberate, con-
scious, slow, careful, agentive attention. The best new-you-
bits need to join the ‘cognitive party’ without being con-
stantly stopped at the sensory gates and asked to show their 
invitations and IDs!’ So, Carter et al. claim that for a tool to 
be genuinely mind-extending (to be a ‘best new-you-bit’), it 
is necessary (as indicated by the use of ‘need’ in the second 
sentence), for that tool to be transparent to (to ‘by-pass’) the 
deliberative, attentive, reflective conscious mind, the kind of 
mind that would apprehend it precisely as an independent 
object. That is how the tool avoids having to show its invita-
tion or ID at the sensory gates! In other words, for Carter 
et al., transparency is necessary for cognitive extension.
Taking transparency to be necessary for cognitive exten-
sion underlies a dynamic version of ExM. Minds grow 
beyond the skin and shrink back to the boundary of the skin, 
depending, in part, on the phenomenological dynamics of 
our couplings with technology. When a tool is transparent, 
that is a necessary condition met for its constitutive incor-
poration into the user’s mental machinery. When a tool 
becomes visible, due to, for example, damage or malfunc-
tion, or when, as in the case of some sensory substitution 
subjects, a deliberate, conscious effort on the part of the user 
resets the mind-world boundary at the skin, that means that 
cognitive extension is no longer operative.
This dynamic, transparency-driven version of ExM is 
at odds with those accounts of when an element, biologi-
cal or otherwise, counts as a genuine part of one’s mental 
machinery that stress persistence rather than transience. For 
example, Rupert (2009) argues that our theorizing about the 
mind ought to track a distinction, prevalent in the empirical 
models produced by cognitive psychologists, between the 
persisting cognitive architecture, characterized by a rela-
tively fixed set of elements with relatively stable relations 
among them, and a shifting set of non-cognitive causal fac-
tors that sometimes combine with that persistent architecture 
to produce intelligent behaviour. According to Rupert, if one 
follows his recommendation, it turns out that ExM is empiri-
cally false, since all the genuinely cognitive components turn 
out to be body-side phenomena (for critical discussion, see, 
e.g., Clark 2011).
Despite Rupert-style intuitions to the contrary (which 
here I note merely for completeness), I think that we should 
be untroubled by the idea that each of us possesses a dynam-
ically growing and shrinking extended mind. That said, the 
advocate of the transparency-driven version of this idea will 
need to say something about the following issue. As Clark 
notes (although in a rather different context):
Ordinary biological memory, for the most part, func-
tions in a kind of automatic, subterranean way. It is not 
an object for us, we do not encounter it perceptually. 
Rather, it helps constitute us as the cognitive beings 
we are… This is not to say that biological memory can 
never turn up as such an object. Bio-feedback devices 
sometimes make our inner activity into an object of 
our own attention. (Clark 2015, 8)
Therefore, although, as noted earlier in relation to our 
sense organs, our own biological machinery is standardly 
transparent to us in experience, it can be made visible to 
us. It is certainly possible, then, for our own brains to be 
consciously apprehended during thought and action. But 
why should this trouble the transparency-citing fan of ExM? 
The reason is that proponents of ExM are wont to play an 
even-handedness card against their neuro-centric opponents 
(see, most famously, the parity principle, as developed and 
deployed by Clark and Chalmers 1998). Very roughly, the 
debate proceeds like this: in the face of the neuro-centrist’s 
claim that the brain is the seat of cognition, the extended 
mind theorist complains that some external element of 
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interest is playing exactly the same role or possesses exactly 
the same property (whatever that role or property may be), 
in intelligent thought and behaviour, as some internal ele-
ment, and if the internal element counts as cognitive, then 
so should the external element. There are, of course, some 
important questions of detail to be settled here, such as how 
to decide which roles and properties are relevant and how 
to determine sameness of contribution (for my responses to 
these questions, see e.g. Wheeler 2010, 2011a). The core 
point, however, should be clear enough: the neuro-centrist 
needs to play fair. But now, if we apply this reasoning in 
the present context, a problem arises for transparency-based 
ExM, because even-handedness cuts both ways. If meeting 
the transparency condition is necessary for an external ele-
ment to count as cognitive, then, to preserve fairness, it is 
also necessary for some internal element to count as cogni-
tive. However, as we have just seen, it is possible for one’s 
own brain to fail to meet the transparency condition, so it is 
possible for one’s own brain to become temporarily divested 
from one’s cognitive architecture. And that is a highly coun-
ter-intuitive result.
What this seems to tell us is that the fan of ExM cannot 
combine the even-handedness principle with the claim that 
the transparency of some external element is necessary for 
that element to have cognitive status. It looks as if something 
will have to give, although the mere fact that there is alleg-
edly a tension here does not tell us which of the two thoughts 
should be rejected, and it is certainly consistent with ExM to 
hold that transparency is a necessary condition for external 
resources, but not for internal resources, to count as cogni-
tive. Nevertheless, there might be a different, less disrup-
tive response available. In the case of using bio-feedback to 
make one’s neural states and processes available as objects 
to consciousness, there is a sense in which those states and 
processes are simultaneously both transparent and visible. 
After all, one is still experiencing the world through those 
states and processes, so the transparency condition is satis-
fied. It is just that the world thereby revealed contains those 
very states and processes as objects. From this perspective, 
there is no tension between the even-handedness principle 
and the transparency condition.
If the reflections of this section are correct, then, in 
endeavouring to design transparent technology (or transpar-
ent human-technology interfaces), we are endeavouring to 
meet at least a necessary condition for cognitive extension, 
that is, for ExM to be true. Therefore, we are at least on the 
way to designing extended minds. Of course, if we try to 
design transparent technology, but fail in the attempt, then 
we have thereby failed to meet a necessary condition for cog-
nitive extension. Moreover, if we were to have a good reason 
to shy away from designing transparent technology, then we 
would thereby be refusing to design extended minds. In the 
next section, I shall argue that, in cases where the technology 
of interest is equipped with a certain sort of increasingly 
popular AI, just such a reason exists.
4  Invisible adversaries
Recently, so-called deep neural networks have been all 
the rage in AI. Such networks typically deploy multi-lay-
ered cascades of nonlinear processing units that deploy 
(supervised or unsupervised) machine learning algorithms 
to perform pattern analysis and classification tasks, by 
deriving higher level features from lower level features 
to build hierarchical representations spanning different 
levels of abstraction. Such systems have famously learnt 
to play games to high levels of proficiency, culminating 
in Google’s AlphaGo, a deep learning system for playing 
the game Go that, in March 2016, recorded a 4-1 victory 
over Lee Sedol, one of the highest ranked human players 
in the world.
In influential research, Szegedy et al. (2013) demon-
strate that deep neural networks are systematically prone 
to so-called adversarial exemplars. Let us consider one of 
Szegedy et al.’s own examples, a network that had success-
fully learnt to categorize images into two groups—‘cars’ 
and ‘not cars’. Szegedy et al. proceeded to systematically 
generate a range of minutely altered images of cars. The 
deformations were very small changes made at the pixel-
level, meaning that, to the unaided human eye, the new 
images looked identical to other images to which the net-
work had been exposed, and which it had learnt to catego-
rize correctly as cars. The in-advance prediction would 
surely have been that the network would correctly classify 
these altered images as cars. However, it did not. With 
spectacular incorrectness, it classified them as non-cars; 
hence, the status of those images as adversarial exemplars.
What lessons should we draw? The first thing to stress 
is that, once in possession of the knowledge that such net-
works are prone to adversarial exemplars, their design-
ers can, of course, systematically include such exemplars 
in the networks’ training sets. This is clearly a practical 
response to adversarial exemplars. However, given finite 
time constraints, there is surely a danger that its effect 
will sometimes be akin to flattening out a lump under a 
carpet. There is a tendency for the lump simply to reappear 
somewhere else. The overarching worry, then, is that deep 
learning networks are learning to categorize the world in 
ways that do not coincide with the way that their human 
users will categorize the world (cf. Carter et al. 2018, 7, 
who, in a discussion of the consequences of such networks 
for our epistemic hygiene in light of extended cognition, 
make the closely related point that deep networks ‘learn 
ways of solving problems that are opaque to their human 
developers’).
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Three further points establish the relevance of the 
foregoing observation to our present concerns. First, as 
Metz (2016) reports in the technology magazine, Wired, 
deep learning systems are ‘already pushing their way into 
real-world applications. Some help drive services inside 
Google and other Internet giants, helping to identify faces 
in photos, recognize commands spoken into smartphones, 
and so much more’. If deep learning networks systemati-
cally classify the world’s patterns in ways that are at vari-
ance with our ordinary human classifications, and if those 
networks are lodged in the workings of the technology that 
organizes and shapes our cognitive lives, then those lives 
will be organized and shaped by those variant classifica-
tions. However, surely we will notice this divergence, I 
hear you say. It is here that a second point becomes rel-
evant. What if the networks in question are fluidly and 
expertly integrated into our everyday activities, such that 
they are transparent in use? Imagine such networks oper-
ating as part of a cognitive-assistant-style wearable that 
classifies situations and transmits the results via an opti-
cal head-mounted display. We have already concluded 
that such behaviour-guiding technology, even though it 
enhances cognitive performance, and even though it is 
operating in cognition central, could be transparent. On 
some occasions, no doubt, its variant classifications of the 
world would lead to mismatches to which the human user 
will be sensitive before anything detrimental occurs. How-
ever, it seems just as likely that subtle changes in one’s 
engagement with the world—changes that, for example, 
have potentially damaging social consequences for how 
one classifies others—might continue to by-pass conscious 
apprehension, at least until it is too late for the user to take 
successful remedial action. The final aspect of this wor-
rying scenario comes to light once one realizes that deep 
neural network applications that meet the transparency 
condition are at least on the way to being correctly treated 
as genuine parts of the user’s own cognitive architecture. 
In other words, if ExM is true, there is a natural path to 
counting such network-driven variant classifications as our 
classifications. This outcome would surely have epistemic 
implications and perhaps moral ones too. If a deep neural 
network application to which I am transparently coupled 
qualifies as part of my cognitive architecture and thus as 
part of me, then the classifications in question—classifica-
tions that unconsciously guide my behaviour—will be part 
of what I unconsciously believe to be the case, and thus 
presumably will have the same status as my more familiar, 
internally realized unconscious beliefs when it comes to 
any moral judgments that are made about my resulting 
thoughts and actions.
How should we respond to these somewhat dystopian 
conclusions? To bring my own proposal into view, I shall 
all-too-briefly connect the foregoing analysis with certain 
related themes that arise in the recent work of Mark Hansen 
(2015). According to Hansen, 21st century media possess 
the operational signature of by-passing consciousness, that 
is, they ‘go directly to behavioural, biometric and environ-
mental data that are increasingly able to capture our “atten-
tion” without any awareness on our part’ (ibid. 58). The 
scare quotes around the word ‘attention’ here signal the fact 
that what concerns Hansen is the capacity of modern media 
to steer decision-making and behaviour independently of 
any explicit conscious apprehension on the part of the user, 
thereby delivering a kind of ‘digital insight’ (ibid. 60). This 
should sound familiar since, as we have seen, deep learn-
ing networks may display the same operational signature. 
Moreover, Hansen suggests (as have I) that such invisibility 
to consciousness is impeded neither by the shift from out-
sourcing to enhancement (what he calls the transition from 
a ‘prosthetic operation of surrogacy [to] the visible inau-
guration of new, properly technical domains of sensation’, 
ibid. 54), nor by the shift from specialized couplings to more 
centrally cognitive couplings (which Hansen discusses in the 
context of a transition from existing medical devices that 
mediate particular bodily activities to imagined applications 
that intervene in cognitive decision-making, ibid. 59–60). 
However, Hansen traces the phenomenological invisibility 
with which he is concerned not to the skilled, hitch-free 
use of 21st century media as tools (a claim that connects 
new media with old media), but rather to the fact that 21st 
century media distinctively function primarily in networks 
of machine-to-machine (as opposed to machine-to-human) 
communication that involve micro-temporal scales and 
thresholds that are beyond our conscious apprehension. In 
other words, Hansen’s key point is that consciousness nec-
essarily lags behind the operational effects of such media.
It is Hansen’s focus on what is necessarily beyond our 
discriminatory awareness that, I suspect, ultimately leads 
him to offer a radical response to 21st century media that 
builds on the work of Whitehead to deliver a reconceptu-
alization of consciousness itself. Here is not the place to 
investigate Hansen’s proposed conceptual shift, but rather 
to note that although his analysis and mine exhibit the clear 
parallels just identified, my focus on transparency through 
undisturbed expert use mandates a response to the threat 
of epistemically divergent smart technology that is, philo-
sophically speaking at least, more conservative in nature, 
turning on the idea (more on which in a moment) of mak-
ing the critical operationality of that technology show up 
to consciousness as ordinarily conceived. Here, then, is my 
suggestion: given that our cognitive lives will increasingly 
be saturated by smart devices that may routinely classify 
the world in ways at potentially damaging epistemic vari-
ance with our technologically unaugmented practices, per-
haps, we need to resist the urge to design for transparency. 
In addition, if transparency is indeed necessary for extended 
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cognition, then this proposal to resist designing for trans-
parency is simultaneously a proposal to resist designing for 
extended cognition. What form might such resistance take?
5  The reappearing tool
An alternative to the goal of transparency is identified by 
the architect Usman Haque in his manifesto for a genuinely 
interactive kind of intelligent building. Increasingly, archi-
tects will be designing buildings that, via permanently 
installed computational systems, will be able to autono-
mously modify the spatial and cognitive environments of 
the people dwelling within them, given what those build-
ings ‘believe’ about the needs, goals and desires of the 
people concerned. As an example, consider an exploratory 
architectural project called Evolving Sonic Environment, 
due to Haque and Davis (reported in Haque 2006; see also 
http://www.haque .co.uk/evolv ingso nicen viron ment.php, 
last accessed 14 April 2017). In this structure, people walk 
around inside an acoustically coupled ‘spatialized’ neural’ 
network (a spatial web of interconnected simple process-
ing units). The movements of the occupants (detected via 
sound) affect the organization of the network (the architec-
tural environment) through the operation of local learning 
algorithms active at each of its nodes. This results in the 
network adapting over time to different patterns of occu-
pancy, often (in a feature that is prescient in relation to our 
foregoing discussion of deep neural networks) developing 
perceptual categories for reflecting those patterns that do 
not necessarily correspond to categories that the human 
observer would employ.
In his treatment of such smart architectural environ-
ments, Haque argues for a model ‘in which people build 
up their spaces through “conversations” with the environ-
ment, where the history of interactions builds new pos-
sibilities for sharing goals and sharing outcomes’ (Haque 
2006, 3). Such conversational interfaces ‘would provide 
us with a method for comparing our conception of spatial 
conditions with the designed machine’s conception of the 
space’ (Haque 2006, 3). Haque’s model of an optimally 
functioning human-AI interface is one of constructive 
interactive dialogue rather than smooth invisibility. In the 
interactive mode of encounter, the technology in question 
is not transparent (it is present precisely as another intel-
ligence), and thus, given the position that we have been 
investigating, the individual’s mental machinery does not 
extend so as to incorporate that technology.
However, at the end of the day, is an interactive dia-
logue with our technology what we really want? Perhaps, 
the pendulum has now swung too far back in the direction 
of intrusive non-transparency. Indeed, it might seem that 
whatever it is that we desire from our smart technology, 
it is not normally the dialogical possibility of misunder-
standing and argument. Therefore, maybe, we are looking 
for a sweet spot in the space of possible interfaces, one 
located somewhere between the two extremes of trans-
parency and intrusion. This is a speculative thought that 
requires more unpacking than I can give it here, but maybe 
an analogy will help. As David Byrne explains in his book 
How Music Works, the goal of the Muzak corporation was 
to smooth out the curves of workforce inefficiency using 
specially recorded versions of popular music tracks (Byrne 
2012, 326–7). It had been noted in workplace studies of 
the 1930s that American workers were alert at some times 
of the day and lacking in energy at others, while the bosses 
wanted a steady and energetic workflow throughout the 
day. This is where  the Muzak corporation came in. Its 
strategy was to manage productivity in the workplace by 
piping in calm music during the high-energy periods of 
the day and mildly livelier music during the low-energy 
periods. This was a technique known as ‘stimulus pro-
gression’. Specially arranged versions of the chosen pieces 
were recorded, with the dynamics of the music (higher and 
lower pitches, jumps in volume) flattened. It was soul-less 
music, hence the disparaging cultural sense of the term 
‘muzak’. But then, as Bing Muscio of the Muzak Corpora-
tion pointed out at the time, it was music to be heard, but 
not listened to. And that, for us, is the point of the analogy 
with smart technology. We do not always want our smart 
technology to be muzak—a transparent factor that manipu-
lates our activities in ways that we do not realize; some-
times, we want our smart technology to be music—not for 
the most part challenging music that interrogates us and 
makes us feel uncomfortable (although there is certainly a 
place for such music and for such technology), but music 
that solicits listening from us, and so in that way shows up 
in our conscious experience. In other words, just as music 
is, for the most part, designed precisely so as to attract our 
conscious attention, but without its invasion of conscious-
ness being evidence of any breakdown in our engagement 
with it, so, the proposal goes, the kind of smart technology 
in which we are interested should be designed with a simi-
lar aim in mind, that is, to disrupt transparency without 
disrupting the skilled use of that technology. That way 
we can check whether the discriminatory verdicts reached 
by such technology coincide with our current take on the 
world. Illuminating models for this phenomenon might 
be road-signs or directions spoken aloud by mobile map 
applications, structures that are designed to enter our 
consciousness to guide navigation without disrupting that 
skilled activity, but which are thereby available for critical 
assessment.
If the foregoing reasoning has any force, and I think that 
it does, then, when it comes to designing the kind of smart 
technology that we have been considering, we should be 
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striving for music not muzak. That is what will enable us 
to restrict the dangers posed by transparent AI-equipped 
devices that categorize the patterns of the world in ways 
that depart from the classificatory norms we recognize. 
However, if we also maintain the position that the phenom-
enological transparency of a device in use is necessary for 
extended cognition, then this amounts to the recommenda-
tion that, when it comes to such smart technology, we should 
be designing for a particular kind of embedded mind, rather 
than an extended mind. To be clear, the conclusion here is 
not that we should not ever design for transparency or for 
extended cognition. After all, there will be many devices and 
applications (especially ‘dumb’ ones) that do not pose the 
sort of risk that we have been working to contain. In these 
cases, arguments which conclude that transparency is a mark 
of good design may, for all I have said, prevail. Nevertheless, 
perhaps recent advances in smart technology should encour-
age us to design for minds that do not always leak into the 
world, but which sometimes remain in close, productive but 
visible coupling with it, and thus for devices that sometimes 
solicit our conscious attention rather than fade from view. 
The tool, it seems, has reappeared.
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